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I argue that high level causal relationships are often more fundamental than low level causal 
relationships. My argument is based on some general principles governing when one causal 
relationship will metaphysically ground another—a phenomenon I term derivative causation. 
These principles are in turn based partly on our intuitive judgments concerning derivative 
causation in a series of representative examples, and partly on some powerful theoretical 
considerations in their favour. I show how these principles entail that low level causation 
can derive from high level causation, and in particular that neural causation can derive 
from mental causation. I then draw out several important consequences of this result. Most 
immediate among these are the implications the result has for aspirations to reduce high 
level causation to its low level counterpart. But the result also bears on the possibility of 
downward causation, the relationship between counterfactuals and causation, and the 
idea—familiar from both the literature on the exclusion problem and the literature on 
proportionality constraints on causation—that causal relationships at different levels 





This is a paper about the connection between causal relationships at different levels of reality. 
Questions about this connection have received enormous amounts of philosophical 
attention. Is there causation at different levels? If so, which levels does it occupy? Is there 
causation at the level of fundamental physics? If we weren’t to find it at the fundamental 
physical level, would it exist at all? Can we make sense of causation at high levels? Do causes 
at different levels compete with one another? Does causation at some levels reduce to 
causation at others? 
I hope to shed light on some of these issues by arguing for the following claim: the level 
of reality occupied by a causal relationship does not always match up with how fundamental 
that causal relationship is. In particular, I argue that high level causal relationships are often 
more fundamental than their lower level counterparts, in the sense that high level causal 
relationships often metaphysically ground their lower level counterparts. Cases of mental 
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causation fit this bill. My feeling thirsty caused me to drink —a high level causal 
relationship—and likewise the neural event underlying my feeling thirsty (call it n) caused 
me to drink—a lower level causal relationship. On the view I defend in this paper, n’s 
causing me to drink is grounded in my thirst’s causing me to drink.1 Causation involving 
more fundamental events is not always itself more fundamental—indeed, sometimes it is 
less fundamental.  
The view defended in this paper is not, to my knowledge, a view that has been 
defended—or even considered—in the contemporary literature. Existing views on the 
relationship between high level and lower level causation in general, and mental causation 
and physical causation in particular, split into five categories.  
Epiphenomenalists deny that there is any high level causation: they maintain that high level 
events never cause anything (Lyons, 2006 and Tammalleo, 2008 defend 
epiphenomenalism, and on one natural interpretation of their view, so do Jackson & Pettit, 
1988 and 1990). According to them, our example of mental causation is impossible: while 
n may well have caused me to drink, the mental event of my feeling thirsty did not. Mental 
events are not suited to causing anything.  
Gappists deny that every event with a high level cause has lower level causes. On their 
view, there are gaps in the physical causal order—not every caused event has a low level 
physical cause. Gappists are liable to deny that the neural event, n, caused me to drink, but 
are happy to admit that my thirst caused me to drink.2 
Identitarians say that the relationship between high level and lower level causation is that 
of identity: every instance of high level causation is identical to an instance of lower level 
causation. Since n is identical to my feeling thirsty, their respective causings of my drinking 
are also identical.3  
 
1 Following Schaffer (2009), I am permissive about what sorts of things stand in grounding relationships, 
allowing for facts, relations, relationships, events, properties, laws, particulars and what have you to be both 
grounds and grounded. (I also follow Schaffer [2009], Rosen [2010] and Audi [2012] in treating ground as 
a relation, in contrast to those who regiment grounding talk with a sentential operator, like Correia [2010] 
and Fine [2012a].) If one insists on reserving the term ground for a relation that holds between facts, then the 
relation I have in mind might be termed metaphysical or ontological dependence (see Rydéhn, 2018). There is 
every reason for those who are happy to relate facts with ground to be happy to relate all manner of other 
things with metaphysical dependence (e.g. whole objects with their parts). In particular, it is natural for such 
philosophers to hold that when the fact that x occurs grounds the fact that y occurs, the event y 
metaphysically depends on the event x. (For those who think the causal relata are facts, like Mellor [1981] 
and Bennett [1988], no such retreat from ground to metaphysical dependence is necessary.) And for those 
sceptical that there are any generic relations of metaphysical dependence, note that the purposes I put 
grounding to in this paper could equally well be served by a combination of more specific dependence 
relations, such as the realisation relation, the determinate-determinable relation, the species-genus relation, 
etc. 
2 Yablo (1992), List & Menzies (2009) and Papineau (2013) are gappists because they all think that, to a 
rough approximation, causes must be proportional to their effects. 
3 Notable identitarians include Kim (1992), Lewis (1994) and Jackson (1995). 
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Independentists maintain that high level causation is independent of lower level causation. 
That is, they deny that my thirst’s causing me to drink depends on n’s causing me to drink, 
and that n’s causing me to drink depends on my thirst’s causing me to drink.4 
Finally, dependentists typically maintain that high level causation depends on lower level 
causation, and thus claim that my thirst’s causing me to drink depends on n’s causing me 
to drink, but not that n’s causing me to drink depends on my thirst’s causing me to drink.5  
I am a dependentist of a different stripe: I claim that lower level causation sometimes 
depends on higher level causation. As the rationale I offer for my view will eventually reveal, 
however, the dependence relationships between high and low level causation are far from 
uniform: in different cases the dependence goes in different directions. Still, in our example 
of mental causation the verdict of my brand of dependentism is clear: n’s causing me to 
drink depends on my thirst’s causing me to drink.  
My argument for the central thesis of this paper—that my favoured stripe of 
dependentism is true—is based on some general principles governing what I call derivative 
causation. By definition, one causal relationship, f caused g, derives from another, p caused q, 
just in case p caused q, metaphysically grounds, f caused g. 
The principles I plump for specify sufficient conditions for one causal relationship to 
derive from another—i.e., for one causal relationship to ground another. I do not seek 
necessary conditions for derivative causation, and toward the end of the paper I give 
examples of derivative causation not covered by my favoured principles. Another feature 
of the principles I am interested in is that they are neutral on the question of what causal 
relationships actually obtain: they tell us whether one causal relationship derives from 
another only given those preestablished causal relationships as input—they do not take 
more fundamental relationships as input and spit out other, less fundamental relationships.  
Unlike the principles appealed to in so much of the existing work on causation and levels 
(e.g., Kim’s exclusion principle [1998 and 2005], and Kroedel & Schulz’s causal grounding 
principle [2016]), the principles I work with are motivated not only by general metaphysical 
considerations but by our intuitive judgments about concrete examples. In particular, my 
principles are closely tied to data generated by our intuitive judgments concerning 
sentences of the form ‘f caused g because p caused q’ in a class of cases that are prima facie 
neutral with respect to the questions at issue in the aforementioned literature. I identify a 
pattern underlying such judgments which characterises a class of structures that we have 
powerful theoretical reason to believe will, in general, result in derivative causation. If these 
structures do indeed generate derivative causation in the way I suggest, it follows 
immediately that lower level causation often derives from high level causation.  
 
4 Variations on this theme appear in Dennett (1973), Baker (1993), Van Gulick (1993), Ross & Spurrett 
(2004) and Woodward (2008) 
5 Examples of dependentism-adjacent views include Kim (1984a), Jackson & Pettit (1988 and 1990) (though, 
as mentioned earlier, they are also naturally interpreted as epiphenomenalists), Wilson (1999), Clapp (2001) 
Levine (2001), Shoemaker (2001) and Kroedel & Schulz (2016). 
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Aside from being surprising in its own right, this result has implications for a number of 
debates about the connection between high and lower level causation. In this paper I can 
only briefly discuss a couple of these implications. One is that the result places constraints 
on the way in which high level causation can be reduced to lower level causation.6 Another 
is the result’s suggestion that causal relationships at different levels do not in general 
compete for their existence in the way suggested by e.g. Kim (1998 and 2005)—who thinks 
that low level causation threatens to exclude high level causation—and Yablo (1992)—who 
thinks that proportional causation threatens to exclude disproportionate causation. And 
another is that the result rules out certain kinds of downward causation, a consequence of 
which is that counterfactual dependence does not suffice for causation—a thesis endorsed 
by nearly every partisan of a broadly counterfactual approach to causation (Hall, 2004; 





A standard way of talking about causation and levels (which I will adopt throughout this 
paper) has it that whether a causal relationship is low level or high level is entirely a function 
of the level of the event occupying the cause role in the relationship, without reference to 
the level of the event that occupies the effect role. Let events whose occurrence is not 
metaphysically grounded in the occurrence of any other event be low level events, and all 
other events be high level events. Then causal relationships whose constituent causes are low 
level will themselves be low level, and causal relationships whose constituent causes are high 
level will themselves be high level. The causal relationship which holds between my thirst 
and my drinking is thus an instance of high level causation, and causal relationships that hold 
between any of the fundamental physical events underlying my thirst and my drinking are 
instances of low level causation.7 We can also define a notion of one causal relationship being 
at a higher/lower level than another. I say that the causal relationship between f and g is 
higher level than the causal relationship between p and q (and the causal relationship between 
p and q lower level than the causal relationship between f and g) just in case both f and g are 
at least as high level as p and q and at least one of f and g is strictly higher level than at least 
one of p and q (where f, g, p and q range over events). 
 
6 For discussion of such reductions, see Kim (1984a and 1984b), Menzies (1988), Price (1992), Strevens 
(2008) and Gallow (2015). 
7 Examples of philosophers who talk this way include List & Menzies (2009, p. 477) and Sinnott-Armstrong 
(2021, p. 868), who speak of high level causation given only a high level cause and an arbitrary physical effect, 
as well as Gibbs (2014, p. 330) and Hoffmann-Kolss (2014), both of whom treat ‘f is a high level cause of g’ 
and ‘f caused g is an instance of high level causation’ as interchangeable. This contrasts with some, like Kistler 
(2017, p. 54), who reserve the moniker high level causation for causal relationships wherein both the cause and 
effect are high level. Though my terminological choices align with the former group of philosophers, my 
argument that lower level causation is often built from higher level causation goes through on either 
understanding of the relevant terms. 
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I will frequently discuss the connection between high and lower level causal relationships. 
In doing so I am discussing the connection between two relationships, the first of which 
involves a high level cause and the second of which involves a cause and effect each of 
which is at least as low level as the cause and effect in the high level relationship, and at 
least one of which is strictly lower level than the events in the high level relationship. Less 
frequently, I will discuss the connection between low and higher level causal relationships. 
In doing so I am discussing the connection between two relationships, the first of which 
involves a low level cause and the second of which involves a cause and effect each of which 
is at least as high level as the cause and effect in the low level relationship, and at least one 
of which is strictly higher level than the events in the low level relationship. It is compatible 
with this that the higher level relationship in this pair is still low level due to its constituent 
cause being low level, while its constituent effect is at a higher level than the effect of the 
other relationship in the pair. For a similar reason, it can also be that the lower level 
relationship in a pair is still high level. Moreover, it can be that a high level relationship is 
not higher level than a low level relationship. This might sound strange, but that doesn’t 
matter—it is just a way of talking that will be convenient for the purposes of this paper. 
Nothing of substance turns on it.  
A question of great interest to metaphysicians, philosophers of science and philosophers 
of mind alike has been whether there is any high level causation, so understood, and, if so, 
how exactly it is related to lower level causation. Of course, such philosophers are not 
interested in the relationship between high and lower level causation in general. There won’t 
be any interesting relationship between one atomic collision causing another in Andromeda 
and the United Kingdom’s declaration of war on Nazi Germany causing the Battle of 
Britain, despite the former being a lower level causal relationship than the latter. Thus, 
with a few exceptions, I restrict myself to investigating the connections between high and 
lower level causal relationships some of whose constituent events are grounding related.8 I will 
usually be interested in pairs comprising a high level causal relationship f caused g and a 
lower level causal relationship p caused q for which the following is true9: either (i) p grounds 
f and q grounds g, or (ii) p grounds f and q = g, or (iii) p = f and q grounds g.10 The main 
example of such a pair that I will focus on has already been introduced. My feeling thirsty 
caused me to drink—a high level causal relationship —and likewise the neural event 
underlying my feeling thirsty (call it n) caused me to drink—a lower level causal 
 
8 In general there is no straightforward connection between the relative levels occupied by some entities and 
the presence or absence of grounding relationships between those entities. The United Kingdom is higher 
level than an atom in Andromeda, for instance, but the latter does not ground the former. And a collision 
between two atoms will be partially grounded in the behaviour of each of those atoms, but it would be a 
stretch to say that the collision occupies a higher level than does the behaviour of each of the two individual 
atoms. 
9 I use italics to signal that the italicised phrase denotes a relationship. I will sometimes also refer to a causal 
relationship f caused g by way of phrases such as ‘f’s causing of g’ and ‘f causing g’.  
10 Unless otherwise stated, every grounding claim I make should be understood as a claim about (strict, 
factive) partial ground (see Fine, 2012b).  
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relationship.11 This pair satisfies clause (ii) of the above condition. Unless I say otherwise, 
when I speak of pairs of causal relationships, one of which is high level and the other of 
which is lower level, I have in mind pairs that satisfy the above condition.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. I start by introducing the phenomenon of 
derivative causation using a series of examples. Then I propose some principles about 
derivative causation based on the conspicuous pattern exhibited by these examples, but 
show that the most flat-footed version of these principles is not sensitive to the way in which 
causal influence can be conveyed along multiple paths. I proceed to show that, 
appropriately qualified, these principles entail the central thesis of this paper: that lower 
level causal relationships sometimes derive from high level causal relationships. From here 
I proceed to tease out several of the thesis’ more interesting consequences (which I listed 
earlier) for the connection between high and lower level causation.  
 
 
3 Derivative Causation 
 
As the views briefly canvassed in the opening section of this paper suggest, the nature of the 
relationship between higher and lower level causation is highly controversial. For this 
reason, we will kickstart our search for principles governing derivative causation with some 
relatively anodyne causal structures which focus on causal relationships that are intuitively 
at the same level of reality. To that end, take a causal relationship f caused g. Suppose that 
for some p it is true that f caused p and p caused g. In cases with this structure, which is 
represented in Figure 1 (where dashed arrows represent causal relationships and big block 
arrows represent grounding relationships between causal relationships), we are usually 
inclined to say that f caused g because f caused p, and that f caused g because p caused g. 
We all know, for instance, that the jury’s verdict caused Socrates to drink hemlock, and 
Socrates’ drinking hemlock caused his death. Here we say that the jury’s verdict caused 
Socrates’ death because it caused him to drink hemlock, and because his drinking hemlock 
caused his death.  
It is reasonable to suppose that these because claims indicate grounding relationships. We 
could, for instance, felicitously replace them with in virtue of claims, which are one of the 
signatures of grounding. But more to the point, a popular way to think of grounding is as a 
building relation (Bennett, 2017), and on a natural way of understanding cases like the one 
above, they involve the building of a more encompassing causal relationship from two less 
 
11 I assume that the causal relata are fine-grained, so that we may distinguish between such intimately related 
things as my feeling thirsty and the neural event that realises it, qua causal relata. Talking, as I do, as though 
the causal relata are events thus involves talking as though different events can occupy the same 
spatiotemporal region. But this is just a way of talking—not a substantive assumption. What I say can be 
recovered in translation by those who deem the causal relata to be facts, property exemplifications, variable 
values or what have you, assuming these alternative relata are finely individuated and stand in the sorts of 
grounding relationships I take events to stand in.  
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encompassing causal relationships. In particular, the relationship between the jury’s verdict 
and Socrates’ death is constructed by chaining together the more immediate relationships 
between the verdict and his drinking hemlock, and between his drinking hemlock and his 
death. When a causal relationship is built from the chaining together of two other causal 
relationships, we have an instance of derivative causation.12 Schematically: supposing that 
f caused g, if f caused p and p caused g, then f caused g is grounded in f caused p and in p caused 
g. Similar reasoning suggests that, on the supposition that f caused g, if f caused p, p caused 
q, and q caused g, then f caused g is grounded in f caused p, in p caused q, and in q caused g. This 
structure is represented in Figure 2. 
 













           Fig. 1 
 
Though this sort of chaining is familiar from the idea that causation is transitive (an idea I 
will return to in Section 4), the fact that it results in derivative causation has not, to my 
knowledge, been remarked on in the literature. This is an unfortunate oversight, it turns 
out. Once one notices the connection between chaining and derivative causation in cases 
like the one above, it is easy to see that something similar is going on in the cases that have 
previously been alleged to exhibit derivative causation in the literature.13 
 
12 These because claims are only diagnostic of derivative causation when we have something like this sort of 
building going on. That the striking of the match caused the match to light because the leak caused oxygen 
to enter the room is no sign of derivative causation in my sense of the term. 
13 An anonymous referee points out that the claim that intermediate links in a causal chain ground the 
causal relationship between the first and last events in the chain is in tension with the idea that grounding 
is well-founded in the sense that every grounding chain terminates in one or more ungrounded things. For 
it is a plausible assumption that, for any f and g where (i) f caused g and (ii) f finishes occurring some nonzero 
length of time before g begins to occur, there will be some p such that f caused p and p caused g. (Note that 
this is different from the somewhat less plausible assumption that causation is dense in the sense that for any 
cause f of g there exists a p such that f caused p and p caused g. Even if we assume that causes must occur 
entirely prior to their effects, it might still be that no interval of time separates f from g.) If this is right, then 
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                Fig. 2 
 
The body of literature which explicitly engages in general theorising about derivative 
causation is small. Goldman (1970), Kim (1974, 2005) and Menzies (1988) are some of the 
few examples, and out of the sorts of cases I am concerned with, they mostly focus on those 
that share a common structure with the following example, due to Kim (1974).  
When Socrates drank hemlock, not only did he die, but his wife, Xanthippe, became a 
widow. His death, however, did not cause Xanthippe to become a widow. Rather, Socrates’ 
death grounds Xanthippe’s becoming a widow—the latter event occurs partly in virtue of the 
occurrence of the former. Despite this difference, the same phenomenon arises in this case. 
For Socrates’ drinking hemlock caused not only his death, but Xanthippe’s widowing. 
Moreover, his drinking hemlock caused Xanthippe to become a widow because his drinking 
hemlock caused him to die.  
What seems to be going on here is that a causal relationship is being chained not with 
another causal relationship, but with a grounding relationship, so as to construct a more 
encompassing causal relationship. As in cases involving the chaining of causal relationships, 
it seems that cases involving mixed chains of causation and ground exhibit derivative 
causation. But while it is intuitively obvious that this will hold generally in the purely causal 
case, it is less obvious that the same is true of the less familiar mixed case. To help assuage 
this doubt, I now present several examples (the first of which is adapted from Goldman 
[1970]) of mixed structures which intuitively exhibit derivative causation. (Rather than 
 
f caused g will be grounded in p caused g, which in turn will be grounded in pʹ caused g (where p caused pʹ and 
pʹ is separated from g by a nonzero interval of time), and so on ad infinitum. But the above assumption is only 
plausible if time is dense (in the sense that there is always an instant of time between any two other instants), 
and the density of time is already enough on its own to generate a structurally similar threat to well-
foundedness, whatever we think of derivative causation. Take, for instance, the existence of the temporal 
interval [t0, t100], which is grounded in the existence of the interval [t50, t100], which in turn is grounded in 
the interval [t75, t100], and so on ad infinitum. In light of this, I see no reason to think that my claims about 
derivative causation generate any novel threat to the well-foundedness of ground. 
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spelling out the examples in detail, however, I simply list the because claims that indicate the 
relevant instances of derivative causation, from which detailed examples can be easily 
reconstructed.)  
 
My opponent’s anxiously eyeing the b6 square caused me to checkmate him because 
it caused me to move my knight to b6.  
 
The criminal’s anger caused him to violate his probation because it caused him to 
assault a friend.  
 
The magnesium’s burning caused its weight to increase because it caused its mass to 
increase.  
 
In each of these cases, the effect in the derivative relationship is grounded in the effect of 
the relationship from which it derives. It thus seems that derivative causal relationships can 
be built not only from chains of causal relationships, but from mixed chains whose first link 
is a causal relationship and whose second link is a grounding relationship. Schematically: 
supposing that f caused g, if f caused p and p grounds g, then f caused g is grounded in f caused 
p. Combining the purely causal case with this mixed case suggests that, on the supposition 
that f caused g, if f caused p, p caused q, and q grounds g, then f caused g is grounded in f 
caused p and in p caused q. These structures are represented in Figures 3 and 4, respectively 
(where small block arrows represent grounding relationships between events). 
Having identified chaining as a feature common to both varieties of derivative causation 
discussed so far, it is only natural to conjecture that there exists a third variety which arises 
in another sort of chaining structure. It is this third variety that is key to understanding how 
high level causation can be more fundamental than lower level causation. The sort of 
structures that give rise to it involve a causal relationship that is built from a chain whose 
first link is a grounding relationship and whose second link is a causal relationship. Our 
earlier example of mental causation instantiates this structure, but is too controversial a 
case to use as intuitive motivation for countenancing derivative causation of this sort. Let 









       
     Fig. 3 
 
 
            Fig. 4 
             
Suppose Xanthippe hated Socrates so much that she wished a painful death upon him. 
However, she did not want to be in the precarious position of a widow in ancient Greece. 
So, when Socrates died, this caused her great anguish. 
The last claim I make in my description of the case might come as a surprise given the 
first claim I made. Didn’t Xanthippe hate Socrates? If so, why would his death cause her 
anguish? It turns out that attention to the derivative causal structure of the case helps to 
reconcile these two facts. For Socrates’ death did cause Xanthippe great anguish, but did so 
because it made her a widow, and because her becoming a widow caused her great anguish.14 Cases like 
this motivate the following schematic principle: supposing that f caused g, if f grounds p and 
p caused g, then f caused g is grounded in p caused g. Similar reasoning suggests that on the 
supposition that f caused g, if f grounds p, p caused q, and q caused g, then f caused g is 





14 At various points in this paper I will use talk of making something happen as a more colloquial stand in for 
talk of one event causing or metaphysically grounding another. I do this in the present case so as to make 
manifest the intuitive force of the relevant claim, which would be reduced were we to substitute this 
colloquial manner of speaking for more technical talk of the grounding relationship running from Socrates’ 











          
    
    
    
    
    
        Fig. 6 
 
This third kind of derivative causation is less familiar than the first two. The first is at least 
implicit in many discussions pertaining to the transitivity of causation, and the second has 
been explicitly discussed at least several times. This third kind, however, has, to my 
knowledge, received no attention at all in the literature. But once noticed, it crops up 
everywhere. Martha Stewart’s sale of certain stocks caused her to go to jail in part because 
she broke the law in virtue of selling those stocks, and in part because her breaking the law 
in turn caused her to go to jail. The horologist’s reduction of the length of the pendulum 
inside a grandfather clock caused the clock to run fast in part because in virtue of reducing 
the pendulum’s length he reduced its period, and in part because his reducing the 
pendulum’s period caused the clock to run fast. 
Combining this third kind of structure with the second kind of structure we considered 
yields yet another principle about derivative causation: supposing that f caused g, if f 
grounds p, p caused q, and q grounds g, then f caused g is grounded in p caused q. This structure 
is depicted in Figure 7. Combining all three kinds of structure yields the final principle 
about derivative causation I will mention: supposing that f caused g, if f grounds p, p caused 
q, q caused r, and r grounds g, then f caused g is grounded in p caused q and in q caused r. This 












              
                











   
          
          
           
   
             
 
        
           Fig. 8 
 
 
4 Principles for Derivative Causation  
 
In summary, the argument of the preceding section went like this. In cases where f caused 
p, p caused g, and f caused g, we are inclined to judge that f caused g because f caused p and 
because p caused g. It is most natural to interpret these because claims as disclosing grounding 
relationships, as in such cases the relationship f caused g seems to be constructed out of the 
relationships on which it depends: f caused p and p caused g. Interestingly, we are inclined to 
make analogous judgments in cases wherein we chain together not two causal relationships, 
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but one causal relationship and one grounding relationship. Given the close analogy 
between causation and grounding, it seems best to subsume these cases to the same pattern: 
more encompassing causal relationships are being constructed from less encompassing 
determination relationships, where determination is the genus of which causation and 
grounding are the only species.15 And because this picture on which chains (i.e. the more 
encompassing causal relationships) are grounded in the links from which they are built (i.e. 
the less encompassing causal relationships) is so theoretically compelling, in endorsing the 
structural principles of the preceding section we are not just fitting a curve to a small set of 
intuitively compelling data points. Rather, the curve is one which, on reflection, we are 
strongly inclined to draw anyway.  
A pithy way of painting the above picture is: derivation results from mediation. The jury’s 
causing of Socrates’ death was mediated by the jury’s causing him to drink hemlock. The 
hemlock’s causing of Xanthippe’s widowing was mediated by its causing of Socrates’ death. 
And his drinking hemlock’s causing of Xanthippe’s anguish was mediated by her becoming 
a widow’s causing of her anguish. Less pithily, the principles about derivative causation we 
have arrived at are the following.  
 
MEDIATION: f caused g derives from p caused q if  
 
(i) f caused g and p caused q, and 
 
(ii)(a) f = p and q determines g, or  
(b) g = q and f determines p, or  
(c) f determines p and q determines g.  
 
The principles enshrined in MEDIATION are able to correctly identify derivative causation 
in examples instantiating every structure we’ve considered so far, and they embody the 
theoretically attractive idea that when determination relationships are ‘linked together’ in 
the right way they ‘compose’ or ‘add up’, yielding more encompassing determination 
relationships.  
As already noted, this idea is related to the more familiar idea that causation and ground 
are transitive relations (Lewis, 1973; Fine, 2012a and 2012b; Paul & Hall 2013). But the 
ideas are not the same, even if we extend the transitivity thesis beyond causation and 
 
15 Why do chains of determination serve to construct causal relationships rather than grounding 
relationships when the chains comprise a mix of causal and grounding relationships, as in Figs. 3–8? One 
possible explanation is that ground is synchronic and causation diachronic. If this were right it would follow 
that the events at either end of a mixed determinational chain cannot be grounding-related since any such 
events are separated by a causal relationship and hence are not simultaneous. Under the same assumptions, 
chains composed entirely of grounding relationships could not ‘add up’ to causal relationships, hence their 
absence from our taxonomy, which means to catalogue only those chains that result in derivative causation.  
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ground taken separately to determination more generally.16 In fact, one of the fruits of the 
idea that determination relationships compose is that it can help to explain the transitivity 
of determination: the reason that, say, every cause f of an event p will share all of p’s effects, 
g, is that the causal relationships between f and p, and p and g, chain together to build a more 
encompassing causal relationship between f and g. 
So, if determination is transitive, the hypothesis that determination relationships add up 
is explanatorily fruitful. But what if, as many have come to think, determination is not 
transitive (e.g., Hitchcock, 2001, and Schaffer, 2012)? Are we then left without any reason 
to think that determination relationships add up in anything like way posited by 
MEDIATION? I think not. Indeed, the bulk of this paper thus far has consisted in the 
presentation of a central reason for thinking determination relationships compose: we have 
firm intuitions in concrete cases which indicate that determination relationships do indeed 
compose. Not all concrete cases, mind you. Cases where transitivity seems to fail are 
precisely the cases in which any intuition that the relevant determination relationships add 
up is absent. But why should our judgement that determination relationships fail to add up 
in these cases force us to revisit our judgement that determination relationships succeed in 
adding up in all manner of other cases? The first sort of judgement lacks any clear relevance 
to the second.  
We can further bring out the irrelevance by adopting a toy theory of causation that does 
not satisfy transitivity. To that end, suppose we think that causation is just counterfactual 
dependence of the right sort between appropriately distinct events. Then we will reject 
transitivity for the obvious reason that counterfactual dependence is intransitive. But after 
attending to enough concrete cases we will likely accept that causal relationships do add up 
in the right circumstances, though circumstances are not always right. This is because the 
counterfactual dependences we take causation to consist in themselves seem to add up. Socrates’ 
death, for instance, counterfactually depends on the jury’s verdict. Why? Presumably it is 
in part because if the jury hadn’t convicted him then he wouldn’t have drunk hemlock, and 
in part because if he hadn’t drunk hemlock he wouldn’t have died. And, given our toy 
theory of causation, the truth of this claim discloses two instances of derivative causation 
wherein causal relationships add up in the relevant sense.17 
 
16 For more on the transitivity of mixed determination, and in particular transitivity in structures of the kind 
exhibited in Fig. 5, see Lee (2021 and ms. ‘Collective Actions, Individual Reasons and Varieties of 
Consequence’). 
17 This discussion also serves to reveal the mistake in a more general objection to derivative causation. The 
objection has it that if causation is counterfactual dependence (or whatever else you like), then positing 
derivative causation of any sort (whether due to the chaining of determination relationships or not) is idle. 
Even if, say, f and g are connected by a chain of causal relationships, their causal relatedness consists directly 
in the counterfactual dependence of g’s occurrence on f’s occurrence—no need to build up the relationship 
between the two events by way of intermediate relationships. But, as we have just seen, it may well be that 
the counterfactual dependence between f and g is itself built from other causal relationships/counterfactual 
dependences, in which case the appearance that the truth conditions for ‘f caused g’ bypass these intervening 
causal relationships is but an illusion. 
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Another reason to countenance the summing of determination relationships irrespective 
of whether determination is transitive is again a reason we have already encountered. How 
are we to explain how Socrates’ death caused Xanthippe’s anguish in spite of her hatred of 
him unless we can appeal to the facts that his death made her a widow and her widowing 
caused her anguish? The way we make this appeal is telling, as we are wont to say that 
Socrates’ death caused Xanthippe’s anguish because it made her a widow, and because her 
widowing caused her to become anguished. This explanatory appeal requires derivative 
causation, as it requires that there is a causal relationship between Socrates’ death and 
Xanthippe’s anguish in virtue of these two other determination relationships, one of which 
is causal. 
Yet another reason to suppose that determination relationships compose is that 
composition allows us to explain how causation can span spatiotemporal gaps. Imagine 
that a long row of dominoes is spaced at intervals and that the fall of the first domino 
eventually causes the last domino to fall. A natural and compelling response to the question 
of how the fall of the first domino caused the fall of the last domino given the spatiotemporal 
gap between the two events is that the fall of the first domino did it by causing intermediate 
falling events which themselves were causally related to the final event, but more 
proximately. These intermediate causal relationships help to bridge the gap between the 
first and the final fallings by chaining together to build a more encompassing causal 
relationship. More generally, we might hope that derivative causation can offer us an 
account of mediated causation, where by ‘mediated causation’ I mean instances of the 
following schema: f caused g by making p happen (where f makes g happen just in case f 
determines g). The idea being that for f to cause g by making p happen just is for f caused g to 
be grounded in some causal relationship in which p is a relatum for the chaining-type 
reasons identified in MEDIATION. (More on this later.) 
So whether or not determination is transitive, the hypothesis that determination 
relationships can be chained together to build more encompassing determination 
relationships has much to be said for it. It’s just that if determination is transitive then one 
more thing can be said in favour of the hypothesis: it can help to explain the transitivity of 
determination.  
MEDIATION itself, however, cannot be used to explain transitivity, as it does not tell us 
that, given two chained determination relationships, these relationships will serve to build 
another determination relationship. This is by design. There is good reason to doubt that 
determination is transitive, and thus good reason to ensure that our principles about 
derivative causation do not require that it is. Instead, MEDIATION aims to tell us about 
derivative causation in structures where transitivity does not fail, which in any case are the 
only structures in which derivative causation could possibly arise. So MEDIATION is not 
directly threatened by failures of transitivity. Unfortunately, however, it is possible to 
transform apparent counterexamples to the transitivity of determination into 
counterexamples to MEDIATION. The key to constructing these counterexamples is the 
observation that just because a path between cause and effect can be traced through 
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intermediate determination relationships doesn’t mean that those intermediaries are the 
ones that actually build the relationship between the target cause and effect.18 Before 
presenting one such example, let’s start with a standard counterexample to transitivity.  
Suppose a boulder falls toward a hiker, causing the hiker to duck, which in turn causes 
him to survive (Hitchcock, 2001). 
In cases like this we are inclined to deny that causation is transitive on the grounds that 
the boulder’s falling did not cause the hiker to survive. For precisely this reason—the 
relevant f fails to cause the relevant g—MEDIATION is not threatened by such cases. But 
suppose we enrich the causal structure of the example in the following way.  
Boulder A falls toward a hiker, causing the hiker to duck, which in turn causes him to 
survive. But Boulder A’s falling also caused Boulder A to hit Boulder B, knocking Boulder 
B off course. And had Boulder A not fallen and knocked Boulder B off course, Boulder B 
would have struck and killed the hiker whether or not he ducked.  
We now have a story in which there is no failure of transitivity. Here, Boulder A’s fall 
caused the hiker to duck which in turn caused the hiker’s survival, and Boulder A’s fall 
caused the hiker’s survival. This case thus falls under MEDIATION’s purview. This is bad 
news for MEDIATION, as here the principle incorrectly predicts that Boulder A’s fall causing 
the hiker to survive is grounded in it causing him to duck, which is the wrong result. Boulder 
A’s fall causing the hiker to duck has nothing to do with why Boulder A’s fall caused the 
hiker’s survival. Rather, the latter relationship is to be accounted for by appeal to the fact 
that Boulder A’s fall caused it to knock Boulder B off course, which in turn caused the hiker 
to survive.  
It is possible to construct similar examples involving mixed determinational chains, but 
the case we already have in front of us suffices to make the point. What seems to have gone 
wrong for MEDIATION in this case is that the failure of determination relationships to add 
up along one chain—Boulder A’s fall caused the hiker to duck, which caused his survival—
is masked by their successfully adding up along another chain—Boulder A’s fall caused 
Boulder B to be knocked off course, which caused the hiker’s survival—comprised of the 
same first and last events but a different intermediate event. Just as the primary lesson of 
the causal modelling literature has been that we must take into account the multiplicity of 
paths along which causal influence on an event might be conveyed (see e.g. Halpern & 
Pearl, 2005), so too the lesson of cases wherein determination relationships fail to add up 
without engendering any failure of transitivity is that we must be sensitive to how 
determination relationships add up along multiple paths, as the successful summing of 
determination relationships along one path can mask the failure of determination 
relationships to sum along another path. And, at the risk of harping on about the issue, note 
 
18 I think these modified counterexamples actually reveal that, against the current of existing literature on 
the topic, which focuses on failures of the transitivity of determination per se, we should instead be concerned 
with failures of chained determination relationships to build the more encompassing relationships that they 




that this attractive explanation of what is going on in these cases requires not only that we 
take derivative causation seriously, but that we take it seriously even having rejected transitivity.  
Let’s try to build this sensitivity to how determination sums along different paths into 
an amended version of MEDIATION. Let a determinational pathway be an ordered 
sequence of events linked by determination relations in a stepwise fashion, so that where f 
determines p and p determines g, ⟨f, p, g⟩ is a determinational pathway. By definition, 
determination is transitive across a determinational pathway P beginning in f and ending in g 
just in case f determines g. Let the variables Pi range over possibly nonactual determinational 
pathways beginning in f and ending in g.19 Holding fixed that P exists, if there are some P1, 
…, Pn (we allow that n = 1) such that, nonvacuously, determination would not have been 
transitive across P if none of P1, …, Pn had existed, we will say that P exhibits ersatz 
transitivity.20 
Our double boulder example exhibits ersatz transitivity. Holding fixed that Boulder A’s 
fall caused the hiker to duck, which in turn caused him to survive, it is true that had it not 
been the case that Boulder A’s fall caused Boulder B to be knocked off course, which in 
turn caused the hiker to survive, then Boulder A’s fall would not have caused the hiker to 
survive. The idea, then, is that by ruling out ersatz transitivity in the right way we’ll thereby 
rule out the above sorts of cases where determination relationships fail to add up, and will 
thus have a way of guarding our principles of derivative causation against counterexample. 
I will implement this strategy by adding to each subcondition in condition (ii) of 
MEDIATION the requirement that the pathway mentioned in that subcondition not exhibit 
ersatz transitivity, yielding: 
 
DERIVATION: f caused g derives from p caused q if 
 
   (i) f caused g and p caused q, and 
 
(ii)(a) f = p and q determines g, and ⟨f, q, g⟩ does not exhibit ersatz 
transitivity, or 
 
19 I allow for the Pi to be nonactual in order to deal with redundant causation. It might, for instance, have 
been that if Boulder B had never fallen, and so the pathway ⟨Boulder A’s fall, Boulder B’s being knocked 
off course, the hiker’s survival⟩ had not existed, then Boulder C would have fallen in such a way that, had 
Boulder A not knocked it off course, then Boulder C would have killed the hiker regardless of whether he 
ducked. In this case, the transitivity of determination across ⟨Boulder A’s fall, the hiker’s ducking, the hiker’s 
survival⟩ does not depend on the existence of ⟨Boulder A’s fall, Boulder B’s being knocked off course, the 
hiker’s survival⟩ alone, but on the existence of at least one of ⟨Boulder A’s fall, Boulder B’s being knocked off 
course, the hiker’s survival⟩ and ⟨Boulder A’s fall, Boulder C’s being knocked off course, the hiker’s survival⟩, 
where the latter pathway is nonactual. 
20 In setting things up this way, I am tacitly assuming that if determination would have failed to be transitive 
along a pathway had some other (possibly nonactual) pathways not existed, then determination would have 
failed to be transitive along that pathway had some other pathways beginning and ending with the same events not 
existed. More general setups are available if need be.  
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(b) g = q and f determines p, and ⟨f, p, g⟩ does not exhibit ersatz 
transitivity, or  
(c) f determines p and q determines g, and ⟨f, p, q, g⟩ does not exhibit 
ersatz transitivity. 
 
DERIVATION makes the correct predictions about derivative causation in every example 
we’ve looked at, and is supported by the same general considerations as MEDIATION. There 
is thus good reason to think that when the conditions stated in DERIVATION are satisfied, 
there is derivative causation.  
 
 
5 Higher Level, Yet More Fundamental 
 
DERIVATION has some unsurprising consequences. It tells us that high level causation 
sometimes derives from lower level causation. Suppose that high caused higher, where high is 
some high level event, and that high caused lower, where lower is some event which is at a 
lower level of reality than higher, which it grounds. It follows that the relationship high caused 
higher is high level, and that the relationship high caused lower is comparatively lower level. 
Assuming ⟨high, lower, higher⟩ does not exhibit ersatz transitivity, DERIVATION tells us that 
high caused higher derives from high caused lower—an instance of high level causation deriving 
from lower level causation. To illustrate: my adjusting the thermostat’s causing the 
temperature of the room to increase—an instance of high level causation—derives from 
my adjusting the thermostat’s causing molecules in the room to move faster—an instance 
of comparatively lower level causation. 
DERIVATION also tells us—again unsurprisingly—that higher level causation 
sometimes derives from low level causation. Suppose that low caused lower, where low is 
some low level event, and that low caused higher, where higher is some event which is at a 
higher level of reality than lower, in which it is grounded. It follows that both relationships 
are low level, but that in spite of this, the relationship low caused lower is lower level than low 
caused higher. Assuming ⟨low, lower, higher⟩ does not exhibit ersatz transitivity DERIVATION 
tells us that low caused higher derives from low caused lower—an instance of higher level 
causation deriving from low level causation. To illustrate: let n0 and n1 be two low level 
physical events in my brain, such that n1 grounds my feeling melancholic. causing of n1—
an instance of low level causation—grounds n0’s causing of my melancholy—an instance of 
comparatively higher level causation.21 
 
21 An interesting variation on this sort of structure involves a lower0 causing a lower1 and a higher0 causing a 
higher1, where lower0 grounds higher0 and lower1 grounds higher1. Here DERIVATION tells us that lower0 caused 
lower1 grounds lower0 caused higher1 and that higher0 caused higher1 grounds lower0 caused higher1. This seems like the 
right result. Consider two machines that flash different coloured lights at one another according to the 
following rules: the second machine will emit a green flash if and only if the first emits a red flash, and will 
emit a viridian flash if and only if the first emits a scarlet flash (both machines can generate flashes in all 
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Yet another unsurprising consequence of DERIVATION is that high level causation 
sometimes derives from low level causation. Suppose that high caused low0 which in turn 
caused low1, and that high caused low1. The second of these three causal relationships is low 
level, the third is high level. Assuming ⟨high, low0, low1⟩ does not exhibit ersatz transitivity, 
DERIVATION tells us that high caused low1 derives from low0 caused low1—an instance of high 
level causation deriving from low level causation. To illustrate: the scientist’s pressing the 
button caused the emission of the photon, which caused the mark on the screen. The 
emission of the photon causing the mark on the screen—an instance of low level 
causation—grounds the scientist’s pressing the button causing the mark on the screen— an 
instance of high level causation.  
In all three of the above cases, the relative fundamentality of the causal relationships 
tracks the relative fundamentality of their relata. But—and here’s where we get to the 
surprising consequences—DERIVATION tells us that this won’t always be so. Sometimes both 
low and lower level causation derive from high level causation. Suppose that low caused 
high1, where low is some low level event and high1 some high level event, and that  high0 caused 
high1, where high0 is some high level event that is grounded in low. It follows that low caused 
high1 is low level, and that high0 caused high1 is high level, and that the latter is higher level than 
the former. Assuming ⟨low, high0, high1⟩ does not exhibit ersatz transitivity, DERIVATION 
tells us that low caused high1 derives from high0 caused high1—an instance of low level causation 
deriving from causation that is both high and higher level.22 To illustrate: let n be a low level 
physical event in my brain that grounds my feeling thirsty. n’s causing of my drinking—an 
instance of low level causation—derives from my thirst’s causing of my drinking—an 
instance of high and comparatively higher level causation.23 
 
manner of different shades of different colours). If on an occasion the first machine flashes scarlet and the 
second returns a viridian flash, we will have a case with the above structure, as the scarlet flash grounds the 
red flash which in turn causes the green flash, and the scarlet flash causes the viridian flash which in turn 
grounds the green flash. Here it seems right to say that the scarlet flash caused the green flash both because 
the red flash caused the green flash and because the scarlet flash caused the viridian flash, as predicted by 
DERIVATION. But this is different from the way in which the causal relationships that result from purely 
causal chaining are multiply grounded in other causal relationships, as there the causal relationships doing 
the grounding clearly don’t overdetermine the obtaining of the grounded relationship. Here, by contrast, it is 
more natural to take the obtaining of the causal relationship between the scarlet flash and the green flash to 
be overdetermined by the causal relationships that ground it. Given that it doesn’t bear directly on my main 
arguments, however, I won’t take a stand on this issue one way or the other.  
22 All four of the above results are independent: none entails any other (though the individual cases used to 
illustrate the results are sometimes instances of multiple results).  
23 Though DERIVATION has the consequence that higher level causation sometimes derives from lower 
level causation and the consequence that lower level causation sometimes derives from higher level 
causation, we need not fear that this will lead to grounding loops, thereby violating the irreflexivity of 
ground. DERIVATION only says that p caused q grounds f caused g when p caused q, f caused g, and one of the 
following conditions is satisfied: (a) f = p and q determines g, (b) g = q and f determines p, or (c) f determines 
p and q determines g. It follows that DERIVATION only says that p caused q grounds f caused g when either p 
or q is an intermediary on a determinational pathway running from f to g. But it is easy to see that whichever 
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Because this result is so surprising, the notion that pathways with the structure ⟨low, 
high0, high1⟩ need not exhibit ersatz transitivity, and the notion that ⟨n, my feeling thirsty, 
my drinking⟩ in particular does not exhibit ersatz transitivity, both deserve some 
comment.24 My comments on the first notion will be brief. The Martha Stewart case has 
the structure ⟨Stewart’s sale of certain stocks, Stewart’s breaking the law, Stewart’s going 
to prison⟩, and thus has the structure ⟨low, high0, high1⟩. I see no reason to think that there 
are other pathways between Stewart’s sale of those stocks and her going to prison, whether 
actual or not, such that the transitivity of determination across ⟨Stewart’s sale of certain 
stocks, Stewart’s breaking the law, Stewart’s going to prison⟩ depends on those pathways. 
Things are not so straightforward in the case of ⟨n, my feeling thirsty, my drinking⟩. For 
it is plausible that in this case we can isolate a low level physical event d such that (i) d was 
caused by n and (ii) it was in virtue of d’s occurrence that I drank. Given this, another 
determinational pathway running from n to my drinking will be ⟨n, d, my drinking⟩.25 For 
this reason, one might worry that, holding fixed the existence of ⟨n, my feeling thirsty, my 
drinking⟩, if no ‘low road’ from n through some potential ground of my drinking (like d) to 
my drinking itself had existed, then n wouldn’t have caused my drinking, in which case ⟨n, 
my feeling thirsty, my drinking⟩ will exhibit ersatz transitivity. If this is right, then 
DERIVATION will not tell us that n’s causing of my drinking is grounded in my thirst’s 
causing of my drinking. 
But this is not right. I say this for several reasons. One is that the machine example from 
note 21 has already shown us that the transitivity of determination across a ‘high road’ like 
⟨n, my feeling thirsty, my drinking⟩ need not depend on the existence of ‘low roads’ 
connecting the ends of the pathway like ⟨n, d, my drinking⟩. Imagine a variation on that 
example in which we’ve gotten rid of the causal connection between scarlet and viridian 
flashes, thereby getting rid of any low road like ⟨the first machine flashing scarlet, the second 
machine flashing viridian, the second machine flashing green⟩ running from the first 
machine flashing scarlet to the second machine flashing green, but in which we’ve 
preserved the high road between the first machine flashing scarlet and the second machine 
flashing green ⟨the first machine flashing scarlet, the first machine flashing red, the second 
machine flashing green⟩. Here it is clear that our removal of a low road has done nothing 
to prevent determination from remaining transitive across the high road. The first machine 
flashing scarlet would clearly still cause the second to flash green (because in virtue of 
flashing scarlet it flashed red, and because its flashing red caused the other machine to flash 
 
of (a), (b) or (c) is satisfied, it cannot also be the case that either f or g is an intermediary on a determinational 
pathway running from p to q. It follows that if DERIVATION says that p caused q grounds f caused g, then it 
does not say that f caused g grounds p caused q. Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to provide 
this assurance. 
24 Thanks to an anonymous referee for persuading me to address this issue. 
25 It is hard to think of an analogue of such a pathway in the Martha Stewart case. There, Stewart’s breaking 
of the law seems to be a bottleneck through which all of the causal influence of her selling those stocks on 
her going to prison is conveyed. 
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green) even if the first’s flashing scarlet hadn’t caused the second to flash viridian. Why 
think that the drinking case is any different?  
Indeed, the high roads in both these cases bear a signature of non-ersatz transitivity that 
is absent from the pathway ⟨Boulder A’s fall, the hiker’s ducking, the hiker’s survival⟩ in the 
double boulder case. Though perhaps we aren’t pretheoretically inclined to think that (as 
e.g. MEDIATION insists) n caused me to drink because my thirst caused me to drink, we 
certainly are pretheoretically inclined to think that n caused me to drink because n was a 
way for me to feel thirsty. Similarly, we are pretheoretically inclined to think that the first 
machine’s flashing scarlet caused the second machine to flash green because the first 
machine’s flashing scarlet was a way for it to flash red. These data are relevant to ersatz 
transitivity because they indicate that the causal connections between n and my drinking, 
and the first machine’s flashing scarlet and the second machine’s flashing green, are due in 
part to the grounding connections between n and my feeling thirsty and the first machine’s 
flashing scarlet and its flashing red, respectively. And when the connection between the first 
and second events on a pathway plays a role in explaining the connection between the first 
and third events on that pathway, this is a sign that the latter connection owes its existence 
to that pathway, and hence that the pathway does not exhibit ersatz transitivity.  
The contrast between the pathway ⟨Boulder A’s fall, the hiker’s ducking, the hiker’s 
survival⟩ and the pathway ⟨Boulder A’s fall, Boulder B’s being knocked off course, the 
hiker’s survival⟩ from the double boulder case further attests to this. For there we are 
inclined to say that the fall of Boulder A caused the hiker to survive because it caused 
Boulder B to be knocked off course, but not that the fall of Boulder A caused the hiker to 
survive because it caused the hiker to duck. And again these inclinations line up with the 
facts about which pathways exhibit ersatz transitivity and which do not. 
A final reason to think that ⟨n, my feeling thirsty, my drinking⟩ does not exhibit ersatz 
transitivity is that, even having supposed away low roads like ⟨n, d, my drinking⟩, if we hold 
fixed the existence of ⟨n, my feeling thirsty, my drinking⟩ then n will still play the functional 
roles of a cause with respect to my drinking. The occurrence of n will remain predictive of my 
drinking, manipulating whether or not n occurs will remain a way of manipulating whether 
or not I drink, the occurrence of n will still explain why I drank, there will still be objective 
reason to bring about n in pursuit of seeing me drink,26 and someone could still be responsible 
for my drinking in virtue of bringing about n. Crucially, the same is not true in the double 
boulder case. There, if we remove the connection between Boulder A’s fall and the hiker’s 
survival via the path ⟨Boulder A’s fall, Boulder B’s being knocked off course, the hiker’s 
survival⟩, Boulder A’s fall no longer plays the functional roles of a cause with respect to the 
hiker’s survival even holding fixed the existence of ⟨Boulder A’s fall, the hiker’s ducking, 
 
26 Even when causal relationships fail to confer subjective reasons they still confer objective reasons. If I believe 
that caffeine will cause my headache to intensify when in fact it will cause it to abate, then though my 
subjective reasons for/against consuming caffeine might not be beholden to the actual causal facts, my 
objective reasons are: I have objective reason to consume caffeine in pursuit of seeing my headache abate. 
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the hiker’s survival⟩. The fall of Boulder A is no longer predictive of the hiker’s survival, 
manipulating whether or not Boulder A falls is no longer a way of manipulating whether 
or not the hiker survives, the fall of Boulder A no longer explains why the hiker survived, 
there is no longer reason to bring it about that Boulder A falls in pursuit of seeing the hiker 
survive, and it is no longer the case that someone could be responsible for the hiker’s 
survival in virtue of making Boulder A fall.27 
On his basis, we can confidently claim to have in our possession a well-motivated 
principle about derivative causation—DERIVATION —which entails that my feeling thirsty 
caused me to drink grounds n caused me to drink. Why, then, does this result remain so 
counterintuitive? One potential reason we find it so surprising is that my thirst depends on n, 
which might prompt us into thinking that the causal relationships my thirst enters into 
should likewise depend on the causal relationships n enters into. While I feel the pull of this 
thought—a thought that, as Sartorio (2006) points out, was arguably endorsed by Kim 
(1974)—I think it is ultimately just an understandable mistake. Perhaps the most obvious 
reason the thought must be mistaken is that the dependence relationships between the 
relata of a pair of causal relationships needn’t have a consistent direction. We might have 
a structure like that depicted in Fig. 7, wherein f causes g, p causes q, f grounds p, and q 
grounds g. Here one of f caused g’s relata depends on one of p caused q’s relata, but so too 
does one of p caused q’s relata depend on one of f caused g’s relata. There is thus no way to 
respect the requirement that dependences between causal relationships reflect dependences 
between their relata in such structures, so it cannot be a genuine requirement on derivative 
causation.  
A more concrete problem with the same thought becomes clear when we consider cases 
involving purely causal chains. Here, dependence between relationships can clearly run in 
the opposite direction to dependence between relata, as when the jury’s verdict causing 
Socrates’ death depends on Socrates’ drinking hemlock causing his death, in spite of the 
fact that Socrates’ drinking hemlock depends on the jury’s verdict. It is no obstacle to the 
existence of this dependence of one causal relationship on another that the cause in the 
independent relationship itself depends on the cause in the dependent relationship. We 
 
27 Note that it is quite possible to think that ⟨n, my feeling thirsty, my drinking⟩ does not exhibit ersatz 
transitivity for the reasons just given while maintaining that the existence of this high road depends on the 
existence of at least some low road connecting n and my drinking, such as ⟨n, d, my drinking⟩. Given such 
a dependence, it might be that supposing away certain possible low-road connections simply entails the 
absence of any high-road connection, in which case these suppositions will be inconsistent with holding 
fixed that ⟨n, my feeling thirsty, my drinking⟩ exists. (Over the last few paragraphs I have been effectively 
assuming that this is not the case.) The counterfactual we use to test for ersatz transitivity will thus have an 
impossible antecedent which will vacuously counterfactually imply that determination is not transitive 
across ⟨n, my feeling thirsty, my drinking⟩. But we have stipulated that only counterfactuals with possible 
antecedents can be indicative of ersatz transitivity, so situations wherein the existence of a high level 




must simply accustom ourselves to the corresponding result in certain mixed determination 
chain cases.28 
Why are we inclined to make this mistake? Perhaps because we conflate the thought 
that dependence between relationships must reflect dependence between relata with the 
closely related thought that dependence of relationships on relata must reflect dependence 
between relata. Here is what I mean. Since n grounds my thirst, my thirst depends on n 
(though not necessarily in the simple counterfactual sense). And since causal relationships 
plausibly depend on the occurrence of their relata, it follows that there is stepwise 
dependence of any causal relationship my thirst enters into on n. Assuming, as is plausible, 
that this stepwise dependence amounts to fully fledged dependence in these cases, it follows 
that the causal relationships my thirst enters into depend on the occurrence of n. This 
thought does indeed seem plausible, and not at all like a mistake. It says that (modulo 
worries about transitivity) causal relationships depend on what their relata depend on. It is 
quite possible, however, to endorse this thought without committing to the mistaken 
thought that dependences between causal relationships straightforwardly reflect the 
dependences between their relata.  
Another reason we might be surprised by the claim that lower level causation sometimes 
derives from high level causation is a tacit commitment to the principle that no entity can 
be more fundamental than its least fundamental constituent. A forest, for instance, is 
constituted by many atoms, but it would be wrong to say that forests occupy the same level 
as atoms, or even a nearby level. We can explain why this would be wrong by appeal to the 
fact that in addition to being constituted by atoms, forests are also constituted by trees, and 
trees occupy a much higher level than atoms. Given the principle that nothing is more 
fundamental than its least fundamental constituent, it follows that forests reside at a level 
at least as high as that of trees.  
Applying this principle to causation and levels, it is perhaps tempting to conclude that 
since, by definition, the events partly constituting high level causal relationships are no 
more fundamental than those partly constituting lower level causal relationships, the former 
relationships can never be more fundamental than the latter. But this simply does not follow 
from the aforementioned principle. So long as both high and lower level causal 
relationships are no less fundamental than their least fundamental constituents, the 
principle is respected. And this is compatible with, say, both relationships being less 
 
28 If indeed Kim (1974) was seduced by this tempting mistake, this would seem to be explained by his 
incautiously generalising from the fact that dependence between causal relationships reflects the 
dependence between their relata in instances like the following: the jury’s verdict caused Socrates’ death 
because it caused him to drink hemlock. Here an event in the dependent relationship—Socrates’ death—
depends on an event in the independent relationship—his drinking hemlock. Unfortunately for Kim, the 
same sort of example he generalised from suffices to refute that very generalisation, as shown above. 
Kim’s hasty generalisation suggests a diagnosis of our inclination to mistakenly think that the relative 
fundamentality of relationships always tracks the relative fundamentality of relata: it often does (as was detailed 
in the first three paragraphs of this section).  
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fundamental than the cause in the high level relationship, while the high level relationship 
is nonetheless more fundamental than the lower level one.  
In fact, if one takes the chaining idea behind DERIVATION seriously, then the principle 
under consideration immediately militates in favour of a view on which lower level causal 
relationships needn’t be more fundamental than their high level counterparts. The chaining 
idea has it that when p grounds f and f caused g, then (assuming ⟨p, f, g⟩ does not exhibit 
ersatz transitivity) the ‘chained’ relationship p caused g is partly built from one of the links in 
the chain: f caused g. Given that built things are partially constituted by their building blocks, 
lower level causal relationships like p caused g will sometimes have their higher level 
counterparts, like f caused g, among their constituents. The principle under consideration 
would then have it that the lower level relationship is no more fundamental than the high 
level one.  
Yet another reason one might be surprised by what DERIVATION has to say about high 
level causation grounding lower level causation is that this sort of derivative causation is 
implausible in cases like the following. Suppose that our old friend n—the highly specific 
neural event that grounds my feeling thirsty—caused the neural event that succeeded it, nʹ 
(which we will suppose to have preceded my drinking). And suppose further that my feeling 
thirsty was also among the causes of nʹ. Then DERIVATION will have it that n caused nʹ 
because my feeling thirsty caused nʹ. But this seems wrong—n did not have to go via my 
feeling thirsty in order to produce nʹ. The process that led from n to nʹ took place entirely at 
the neural level.  
Granting that my thirst caused nʹ, the above argument would indeed put pressure on 
DERIVATION. But I see no reason to grant this premise. Causes might not have to be fully 
proportional to their effects as e.g. Yablo (1992) says they must (after all, Socrates’ drinking 
poison is better proportioned to his death than his drinking hemlock—any poison would 
have done the job—but the latter is still among the causes of his death), but that doesn’t 
mean that just any event grounded by a cause will be a cause of the same. The jury’s 
convicting Socrates caused his death, but the jury’s convicting someone (an act they 
performed in virtue of convicting Socrates) didn’t. So it is with the above case: though n 
grounds my thirst, my thirst nonetheless fails to cause something that n causes, namely nʹ.  
Far from being a reductio of DERIVATION, then, the above argument is actually a reductio 
of certain kinds of downward causation—i.e., causation of a lower level event by a high level 
event. Indeed, one can see DERIVATION as crystallising previously inchoate worries about 
downward causation into a sharp concern: downward causation requires that low level 
physical causal linkages depend on causation at higher levels, which is not always plausible. 
Bringing these dependences to the fore enables us to distinguish between acceptable and 
unacceptable instances of downward causation. Since it is implausible that n caused nʹ 
because my thirst caused nʹ, DERIVATION precludes my thirst from being a downward 
cause of nʹ. But since it is plausible that the physical event that grounds the scientist’s 
pressing the button caused the emission of the photon because the scientist’s pressing the 
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button caused the emission of the photon, the pressing isn’t ruled out as a downward cause 
of the emission. 
An important corollary of the limitations on downward causation imposed by 
DERIVATION is that a widely endorsed thesis about causation is false, namely that 
nonbacktracking counterfactual dependence (see Lewis, 1979) between wholly distinct 
events suffices for causation.29 Suppose that if n hadn’t occurred then its effect nʹ wouldn’t 
have occurred either. Then, since n necessitates my thirst (a convenient but dispensable 
assumption), n would not have occurred had I not felt thirsty, and hence nʹ wouldn’t have 
occurred either. However, paying due attention to derivative causation reveals that the 
counterfactual dependence of nʹ on my thirst is no guarantee that the latter causes the 
former.30 
A final reason for our intuitive surprise at the central thesis of this paper could be an 
intuitive commitment to ‘reducing’ high level causation to lower level causation, of a certain 
sort. When I throw a rock into a window and the window shatters, we are wont to say that 
my throw caused the shattering—a high level causal relationship—but that this is grounded 
in innumerable instances of lower level, microphysical causation: a collision between one 
of the rock’s atoms and one of the window’s atoms causing the latter to move; a collision 
between another of the rock’s atoms and another of the window’s atoms causing the latter 
to move; and so on. The high level causing seems to happen in virtue of all these low level 
causings.31 
I am happy to admit this, but again in doing so I make no quarrel with DERIVATION. 
While DERIVATION does not entail the above instances of derivative causation, it is quite 
compatible with them, and even with a more ambitious project of grounding all high level 
causation in lower level causation of this sort (Strevens, 2008 pursues this kind of project).32 
 
29 This thesis is near-universally endorsed by those working on causation in the counterfactual tradition 
(Hall, 2004; Paul & Hall, 2013). For independent reason to reject the thesis, see my manuscript ‘Cause and 
Control’. 
30 This argument that nʹ counterfactually depends on my feeling thirsty may look like it erroneously assumes 
the transitivity of the counterfactual conditional, but in fact it does not. Since it is true that if neither n nor 
my feeling thirsty had occurred then nʹ would not have occurred either, all I require is that the counterfactual 
conditional obey limited transitivity—a principle about conditionals which holds the rare distinction of not 
being the target of any counterexamples in the literature (Walters, 2016): 
 
 φ ☐→ ψ  
          φ ∧ ψ ☐→ χ  
          ————— 
             φ ☐→ χ  
 
(Where ‘☐→’ means the counterfactual conditional.) Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to 
clarify this point. 
31 Thanks to Brad Weslake for discussion on this point. 
32 DERIVATION is neutral on the question of what the fundamental level of causation is (if indeed a single 
fundamental level is even in the offing). Despite having the consequence that high level causation is often 
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That said, DERIVATION is inconsistent with some antecedently plausible ways of grounding 
high level causation in lower level causation. In particular, it entails the falsity of the thesis 
that each high level f caused g is grounded in every relationship p caused q such that (i) p is low 
level and grounds f and (ii) q grounds or is identical to g, as well as a strengthened version 
of this thesis that changes (i) to require only that p ground f. To see why, consider the high 
level causal relationship between my thirst and my drinking, and the low level causal 
relationships between n and my drinking. Since n is low level and grounds my feeling thirsty, 
both aforementioned theses entail that n caused me to drink grounds my feeling thirsty caused me 
to drink. But we have already seen that DERIVATION entails that the grounding relationship 
goes in the other direction in this case. Since ground is asymmetric, this prediction of the 
above theses is inconsistent with DERIVATION. 
These principles bear a resemblance to some of the so-called ‘causal inheritance 
principles’ discussed in the literature, such as the following principle inspired by Kroedel & 
Schulz (2016): every high level f caused g is grounded in some p caused g where p grounds f.33 
DERIVATION reveals this principle to be false as well. For in any case in which f caused g, 
p caused g and p grounds f, and in which ⟨p, f, g⟩ does not exhibit ersatz transitivity, 
DERIVATION will rule that p caused g is grounded in f caused g, which is inconsistent with the 
verdict of the aforementioned principle given the asymmetry of ground.  
The foregoing discussion of the rock and the window revealed a kind of derivative 
causation that we have not yet discussed. Unlike the derivative causation in our existing 
taxonomy (as catalogued by DERIVATION), this sort of derivative causation is not a 
manifestation of the construction of a causal relationship by way of the chaining together 
of other determination relationships. Rather, it stems from the way in which parts of whole 
causes cause parts of whole effects. The existence of this extra kind of derivative causation 
demonstrates that DERIVATION only has good prospects as a sufficient condition for the 
phenomenon.  
I refrain from adding extra clauses to DERIVATION so as to cover this new case, and 
perhaps thereby render the condition both necessary and sufficient for derivative causation 
because this new case reveals derivative causation to be a heterogenous phenomenon. 
While it loosely seems to involve ‘construction’ in all its manifestations, the ways in which 
one causal relationship can be constructed from others are many and varied. Sometimes 
this construction involves chaining, and other times it involves parts of cause-wholes 
causing parts of effect-wholes. 
 
more fundamental than its lower level counterpart, it does not commit us to a ‘middleist’ or ‘topist’ (see 
Bernstein 2020) stance on causation, according to which middle levels of causation are the most fundamental 
causation, or the highest levels of causation are the most fundamental causation, respectively.  
33 This is a version of what Kroedel & Schulz dub the ‘Causal Grounding principle’ (2016, p. 1914). Their 
version requires that the relevant p and g be physical events, though the motivation they cite in favour of 
this principle is equally motivation for the principle I articulate above. In any case, DERIVATION also refutes 
their version of the principle.  
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 And in fact there is likely to be yet another sort of derivative causation in cases where 
one causal relationship grounds an event that figures in another causal relationship, as 
causal relationships will typically depend on what their relata depend on. For instance, 
Oswald’s killing Kennedy caused a nation to mourn. But Oswald’s killing Kennedy is 
grounded in Oswald’s pulling the trigger causing Kennedy to die. And since Oswald’s 
killing Kennedy in turn partly grounds Oswald’s killing Kennedy causing a nation to 
mourn, it is plausible that Oswald’s pulling the trigger causing Kennedy to die grounds 
Oswald’s killing Kennedy causing a nation to mourn—an instance of derivative causation. 
So sometimes causal relationships are constructed by event-building, it seems.34 It is hard 
to see how we might extract a pattern from these three kinds of structure that would allow 
us to be confident that we have now surveyed every kind of derivative causation.  
DERIVATION thus only purports to cover a certain kind of derivative causation. It is, 
however, a particularly important kind—the kind associated with mediated causation.35 
Testifying to the importance of mediated causation are the various philosophical uses the 
two have been put to in, for instance, understanding action (Goldman, 1970, in his analysis 
of ‘level generation’ and the by locution), understanding what it is to do good and do bad 
(Pettit, 2018), and understanding ways-for-it-to-be-that-φ, truthmaking, parthood, subject 
matter, helpfulness/contribution/relevance, and other cognate notions (Yablo, 
forthcoming).  
More explicitly, my conjecture is that (i)-(ii) of DERIVATION are satisfied just in case it 
is true for the f, g, p and q mentioned therein either that f caused g by making p happen, or 
that f caused g by making q happen. On this view, whenever we make a claim to the effect 
that the causal relationship between events f and g is mediated by a third event p, we are 
thereby committed to f caused g being grounded by some causal relationship in which p 
figures as a relatum. If the fall of the first domino causes the third to fall by making the 
second fall, then the fall of the first causing the fall of the third is grounded in some causal 
relationship in which the fall of the second domino figures as a relatum. In particular, it is 
grounded in the fall of the first domino causing the fall of the second domino, and in the 
fall of the second domino causing the fall of the third. And likewise we can move from 
claims of derivative causation in the sense captured by DERIVATION to claims of mediated 
causation. If the fall of the first causing the fall of the third is grounded in the fall of the first 
causing the fall of the second, then the first’s fall caused the third’s by making the second 
fall.36  
 
34 Thanks to Cian Dorr for discussion on this point. 
35 Recall that instances of mediated causation are instances of the following schema: f caused g by making p 
happen. Where, again, f makes g happen just in case f either causes or grounds g.  
36 Claims like the following constitute potential counterexamples to the conjecture: my thirst caused me to 
consume vitamin C by causing me to drink orange juice. In the right circumstances, such a claim will strike 
us as true, yet it is far from clear that my drinking orange juice either caused or grounds my consuming 
vitamin C, and hence far from clear that this claim of mediated causation will satisfy (i)-(ii) of DERIVATION. 
I lack the space to give this example the treatment it deserves here, but suffice it to say that claims like the 
above will be controversial, as their truth seems to require that we are able to explain the occurrence of 
 
28 
Further testifying to the plausibility of this conjecture is the apparent synonymy of ‘f 
caused g by making p happen,’ with ‘f caused g in virtue of making p happen’. If genuine, this 
synonymy means that when f causes g by causing p it also causes g in virtue of causing p, 
which is precisely the sort of derivative causation that the conjecture associates with these 





The principles we have found to underly derivative causation militate in favour of a 
dependentist perspective on the relationship between high and lower level causation, as, given 
plausible auxiliary assumptions, they entail that relationships of dependence will often 
obtain between causal relationships of each sort. But more than this, they militate in favour 
of a particularly striking version of dependentism on which lower level causal relationships 
will often depend on their higher level counterparts. One might doubt, however, that my 
arguments will be found compelling by partisans of other perspectives. Sure, derivative 
causation might persuade independentists to change their ways, but what about 
epiphenomenalists, gappists, and identitarians? Both epiphenomenalists and gappists deny 
the existence of some of the causal relationships that figure crucially in the examples I used 
to illustrate the phenomenon of derivative causation, and it is open to identitarians to deny 
that these causal relationships are apt to enter into grounding relationships with one 
another due to their being identical.  
This way of viewing the dialectic, however, understates the persuasive force of my 
position, as it fails to account for the way in which what I have said undermines some 
popular motivations for epiphenomenalism, gappism, and identitarianism. One 
particularly influential reason that has been cited in favour of each position is that causal 
relationships at different levels compete for their existence.37 If n and my feeling thirsty are 
indeed distinct events, they do battle with one another for the status of being a cause of my 
drinking, with only one coming out victorious. Or, at least, this is the idea. The 
epiphenomenalist who is motivated to adopt their position because of this kind of worry 
about causal competition says the battle goes to n, the similarly motivated gappist says it 
 
particular events by appeal to events that neither ground nor cause them. That my thirst caused me to 
consume vitamin C by causing me to drink orange juice, for instance, seems to entail that I consumed 
vitamin C because I drank orange juice. And this explanation will be non-causal and non-grounding given 
the plausible assumption that my drinking orange juice neither grounds nor causes my consuming vitamin 
C. Given the pedigree of the position that all explanation of particular events is either causal or grounding 
explanation (see e.g. Railton, 1981; Salmon, 1984; Lewis, 1986; and Skow, 2014), I take it that not all will 
find this a persuasive counterexample to my conjecture.  
37 This thought can be found in Kim (1998 and 2005) in his discussion of the exclusion problem, and in Yablo 
(1992) in his discussion of proportionality constraints on causation. 
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goes to my feeling thirsty, and the similarly motivated identitarian seeks to avoid conflict 
altogether by saying that n and my feeling thirsty are one and the same.  
In response, I say that causal competition is but a mirage! Our findings about derivative 
causation tell us that far from being in competition for causal status, the causal relationship 
between e.g. my feeling thirsty and my drinking actually supports the causal relationship 
between n and my drinking. So to the extent that epiphenomenalists, gappists, and 
identitarians are motivated by the bogeyman of causal competition, I say that they should 
instead be dependentists, and indeed should embrace the provocative version of this view 
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